Intelligence Report FPV Drone Threats to the Maritime Industry in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, South America, and Libya

FPV Drone Threats to the Maritime Industry in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, South America, and Libya

Date: 11:42

Classification: Restricted

Executive Summary

The growing utilization of First-Person View (FPV) drones for asymmetric warfare presents an emerging and high-risk threat to the maritime industry. Intelligence gathered from various regions—including Chad, the Central African Republic (CAR), Benghazi (Libya), and Somalia—indicates that Russian-backed training programs are exporting FPV drone tactics learned from the Ukraine conflict to militias, rebels, and government forces across Africa, the Middle East, and South America.

A recent PIA technical analysis of multiple 8-inch and 10-inch FPVs recovered in Africa and South America has identified consistent design similarities with Russian-engineered impact detonators and magnetic field platinas, reinforcing concerns about the extension of Russian influence in these regions. Additionally, the potential deployment of FPV drones from pirate skiffs and mother ships in Somalia significantly increases the risk to commercial and naval vessels operating in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

1. Russian-Trained FPV Drone Operators and Expansion of Influence

Intelligence sources confirm that Russian military and private security contractors (PMC) with combat drone experience from Ukraine are conducting FPV drone training programs in Africa and South America. The primary regions of activity include:

• Chad & CAR: Russian advisors are training militias and government forces in FPV drone engineering and operations.

• Benghazi, Libya: Training of former Libyan National Army (LNA) now led by Haftar and affiliated militias on FPV-based precision strike tactics.

• Somalia: Training of pirate networks and non-state actors to operate FPVs as a maritime attack platform.

• South America: Presence of Russian-trained FPV operators in Venezuela and Colombia, suggesting the potential for FPV-assisted smuggling and asymmetric naval threats.

The tactics and technologies being exported from Ukraine’s battlefield include:

• Long-range FPV strike capabilities (ILRS-based communication systems).

• Integration of magnetic detonators for ship-based targets.

• Maritime launch methodologies from small vessels and drones adapted for low-altitude strikes.

  
  

2. FPV Drone Components and Technical Analysis

A PIA technical analysis team, composed of former Ukrainian FPV drone operators and developers, recently returned from Africa with forensic data on FPV drone components, revealing key insights:

• Drones found in multiple regions (Africa & South America) share a similar design philosophy with Russian-made FPVs.

• Impact detonators and magnetic field platinas resemble those used by Russian FPV drones in Ukraine.

• Most FPVs analyzed operate on ILRS (Improved Long-Range Signal) systems, increasing range and operational flexibility.

  
  

Key Maritime Threat Characteristics:

• Drone Size: 8-inch and 10-inch FPV drones recovered.

• Payload Capacity: Capable of carrying up to 1 kg of explosives, suitable for targeting ships' bridge sections, antennas, or radars.

• Range: 10+ km in open-sea conditions due to the absence of signal obstructions.

• Deployment: FPVs can be launched from small pirate skiffs or disguised mother ships, significantly enhancing maritime attack capabilities.

3. Potential Maritime Threat Vectors

Red Sea & Gulf of Aden

• FPVs launched from pirate skiffs targeting commercial vessels.

• Use of magnetically triggered impact detonators for hull damage.

• Employment of FPVs for kamikaze-style attacks against military/naval vessels.

  
  

Libya & Benghazi

• Deployment of FPVs to disrupt oil and maritime traffic.

• Militias using FPVs for coastal attacks on competing factions.

  
  

South America

• FPV use for drug cartel smuggling operations and port sabotage.

• Russian-trained operators providing technical expertise to non-state actors.

  
  

4. Strategic Implications for the Maritime Industry

Short-Term Risks:

• Increase in FPV drone attacks against commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

• Higher probability of piracy incidents incorporating FPV drone strikes.

• Potential for FPV-assisted smuggling operations in South America.

  
  

Long-Term Risks:

• Proliferation of FPV maritime warfare tactics beyond Somalia to other piracy-prone regions.

• Greater integration of FPV drones in hybrid naval warfare strategies.

• Expansion of Russian influence through asymmetric drone warfare.

  
  

5. Recommendations for Maritime Security

1. Early-Warning Systems:

   • Integrate FPV detection sensors on ships to counter ILRS-controlled drones.

   • Deploy anti-drone EW systems on key trade routes.

2. Security Protocols:

   • Implement counter-FPV training for vessel security teams.

   • Enhance onboard protective measures, including physical barriers and anti-drone nets.

3. Regional Monitoring & Intelligence Sharing:

   • Increase surveillance of Russian-backed training programs in Africa and South America.

   • Collaborate with naval forces and intelligence agencies for real-time threat assessment.

     
     

Overview

The presence of Russian-trained FPV drone operators in Africa and South America and their potential deployment against maritime targets represent a serious asymmetric threat to global shipping, oil transport, and military logistics. The Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, Libya, and South America are high-risk zones where FPV drone-based maritime attacks could escalate in the near future. Urgent action is required to detect, counter, and mitigate these threats before they become a fully operational and widespread menace.

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Prepared by:PIA Intelligence Division Restricted Distribution